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ABSTRACT
This paper examines theory and evidence from recent studies into the contributions to
economic growth of expenditure on education and on research and development.   Investment in
human capital has fundamentally different economic attributes to physical investment - exhibiting
complementarity, positive feedback and non-rivalry -  implying the potential to enhance economic
growth over a long time period.
In the case of education, there are debates over whether changes in educational attainment
ultimately affect the long-run growth rate of the economy, or only the long-run level of output.  The
macroeconomic evidence on level effects is consistent with microeconomic estimates of private rates
of return to schooling.  It appears, however, that there are also significant long-term growth effects
– the more educated is the workforce, the better is it able to implement technological advances.
There is consistent evidence of high social rates of return on research and development in
both commercial areas of research and in more fundamental research, implying that R&D is under-
resourced.  A number of studies have emphasised the importance of international technology
spillovers, particularly for smaller economies such as Australia.
Steve Dowrick
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The importance of human capital for economic growth was highlighted in much 
of the ‘new growth theory’ that came to prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The neo-classical growth model, formalised three decades earlier, had focused on the 
accumulation of machinery and equipment and emphasised the feature of diminishing 
returns– which implied that such investment would not be able to drive long-run growth.  
The new generation of studies switched attention to the accumulation of human capital 
and the possibility that returns to investment in education, training and research may not 
suffer from diminishing returns. 
There is an important distinction between embodied and disembodied human 
capital.  Human capital in the form of abilities and skills is embodied inasmuch as it lives 
and dies with particular people.  We invest in human capital not only through formal 
education and training programmes, but also through experience on the job and through 
domestic and social interaction.  The time and effort devoted to parenting, for example, 
represents an enormous investment in the human capital of the next generation.   
The accumulation of abilities contributes both to psychic rewards and to marketed 
economic activity.  Whilst the value of the former is hard to measure, there are relatively 
straightforward ways for us to measure the latter.  Economists are only just beginning to 
address seriously the task of evaluating non-market activities such as domestic labour – 
see, for example, Folbre and Nelson (2000) and Apps and Rees (2001).  I focus in this 
paper on market-related returns to human capital because we do not yet have 
internationally standardised valuations of non-market activities.   
The most extensively documented feature of embodied human capital is the 
relationship between education and wages.  Studies of earnings in advanced capitalist 
economies typically find that each extra year of schooling raises earnings by five to ten 
percent.   These findings are confirmed by Australian studies such as Miller et al. (1995), 
who analyse earnings of twins and find that the return to a year of education lies between 
4.5% and 8.3%, and Preston (1997) who reports high rates of return to advanced 
educational qualifications.  The results of Miller et al. are particularly interesting because 
they control for the influences of genetic and domestic background to identify the direct 
contribution of education – following studies by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), 
Ashenfelter and Rouse (1997) and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) which estimate US rates 
of return between nine and sixteen percent. 
This evidence leads us to expect that, if the average educational attainment of the 
working-age Australian population were to rise by one year, real GDP should rise by up 
to eight percent.   This increase in the level of GDP will, typically, take place gradually.  
An increase in the length of schooling of teenagers will only increase the average 
educational experience of the adult population as the new, better-educated cohorts enter 
the workforce, replacing older cohorts.  We expect the transition to last four decades, if 
people enter the labour force aged 20 and exit at an age of about 60.  If this is so, the 
annual growth rate of GDP will be 0.2 percentage points above trend during the transition 
period, resulting in an overall 8% increase, after which time the growth rate will revert to 
trend – with, perhaps, some lagged adjustment to the stock of physical capital.  In this 
sense, changes in educational investment are predicted to have growth effects in the short-
run (albeit a short-run of forty years), but only level effects in the long-run.   3
This is the conventional approach, which treats human capital as an investment 
good in much the same way as a farmer might consider investing in tractors.  There are, 
however, features of human capital that can give it a much more important role in 
economic development.  This is particularly true when we turn our attention to 
disembodied human capital, the realm of knowledge and ideas which do not live and die 
with their inventors but can be transmitted freely between people and carried forward 
over generations.    
A crucial economic attribute of disembodied human capital, highlighted in recent 
models of endogenous growth, is that ideas are both non-rival and cumulative.  Non-
rivalry implies that once the idea of using electronic circuits to carry out binary 
computations has been announced, people can simultaneously use this idea to develop a 
wide range of applications.  One person’s use of the idea does not prevent another person 
from using it at the same time.  Moreover ideas are cumulative: the idea of electronic 
computing has lead to the idea of quantum computing which may in turn lead to yet 
further ideas.    
Analysis of these attributes of non-rivalry and cumulative feedback has led 
growth theorists to speculate that investment in the generation of ideas can be the engine 
of long-run growth.  The non-rivalry of knowledge also leads us to expect market failure.  
When others reap the benefits of someone’s new ideas, market forces alone are unlikely 
to generate the optimal level of investment in knowledge - implying a need for 
government subsidy.   
If the generation of disembodied human capital – ideas / technology - is the 
engine of growth, we should expect to find that embodied human capital – skills and 
abilities – also affect long-run growth.  Ideas do not reproduce themselves without the 
input of highly skilled researchers.  Perhaps of equal importance, the more skilled the 
workforce, the better they are able to absorb, implement and adapt the new ideas 
emanating from the R&D sector.  To the extent that technological change is endogenous, 
we expect educational attainment to have long-run growth effects in addition to the 
conventional prediction of level effects. 
In the following sections I review and evaluate evidence from recent theoretical 
and econometric studies relating economic growth to investment in both embodied and 
disembodied human capital.  I restrict my attention on the empirical front to the relatively 
well-documented areas of investment in formal schooling and R&D, noting that this 
omits potentially important areas of investment in health and in informal education and 
training that takes place within the family and within the workplace. 
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1.  Re-thinking Economic Growth:  the role of knowledge 
 
    Knowledge is fundamental to economic progress.  Our material standard of living 
would be reduced to unrecognisable levels if we were to suffer collective amnesia  - 
forgetting that a circular shape reduces friction, not remembering how to read and write, 
losing all knowledge of electro-dynamics.   All economic activities depend on institutions 
that encourage the preservation, transmission and development of knowledge.   
This seems blindingly obvious.  Yet for several recent decades, the economic 
analysis of growth was dominated by an approach that sidelined the role of knowledge.  
Economists concentrated on the accumulation of objects rather than the accumulation of 
ideas. 
The object-oriented approach to economic growth was formalised in 1956 by two 
economists operating at opposite ends of the globe:  Robert Solow at the MIT in 
Cambridge and Trevor Swan at the ANU in Canberra.  Their neo-classical growth models 
were formulated independently but in broadly the same way, leading to similar 
conclusions.    Accumulation of capital – machinery, buildings, equipment, etc. - is the 
engine of growth in the short-run.  Policies that increase the share of resources going to 
investment will raise the productive capacity of the economy.  But as the growth of the 
capital stock outpaces the limited resources of land and labour, the impact of each 
successive unit of investment is diminished.  However large the boost to the investment 
rate, growth will eventually revert to some fixed rate determined by exogenous 
technological progress. 
This implication of the neo-classical growth model is illustrated in Figure 1.  A 
boost to investment at time T0 raises the rate of growth (the slope of the logarithmic 
output line) from the solid line A to the dashed line B.  Ultimately, however, growth 
reverts to the exogenous rate, where line B becomes parallel to line A, albeit with output 
and incomes at a higher level than would have obtained at the lower investment rate.  Tax 
incentives, or other policies that influence investment, affect only the level of output, not 
the long-run rate of growth.   
The key to this conclusion is the assumption of diminishing returns to capital 
accumulation.  Underlying this notion is the idea of capital as a collection of similar 
objects.  A self-employed dress-maker who purchases his first sewing machine will 
register a large increase in annual output.  Purchase of a second machine will reduce the 
amount of down-time when the first machine is under repair – but the consequent 
addition to annual output is relatively small.  A third machine would probably be 
redundant.  This assumption about diminishing returns is typically captured in growth 
models by postulating an aggregate production function of Cobb-Douglas form exhibiting 
constant returns to scale, where output per unit of labour at time t, yt, is related to the net 
capital stock per unit of labour, kt, as: 
  () tt t yA k
α =  [1] 
The elasticity of output with respect to capital, represented by the parameter α , is 
assumed to be less than unity.  The parameter At represents the level of technology at   5
time t, sometimes referred to as total factor productivity.   













which, given α  < 1, diminishes towards zero as capital intensity increases. 
the revolution in growth theory:  endogenous growth 
This way of thinking about economic growth was challenged in a series of papers, 
starting with Paul Romer in 1986, heralded as ‘the new growth theory’ or ‘endogenous 
growth theory’
1.  A prominent feature of this new wave of economic models, indeed their 
defining feature, is that policy intervention and the nature of institutions can influence the 
long-run growth rate of the economy.    
Figure 1 
The impact of increased investment in the neo-classical and  

















In terms of Figure 1, the new models suggest that policy or institutional change, 
instituted at time T0, could permanently alter the slope of the growth path – as illustrated 
by the dotted path C. 
There are various technical features of these models that make it feasible for the 
long-run growth rate to be determined endogenously, i.e. determined by economic 
                                                 
1 The key papers are Romer (1986), Romer (1990), Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992).  Romer (1993) acknowledges the intellectual debt due to Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, Arthur 
Lewis and others.  Further important contributions, analysing specialisation, have come from Australian 
economists: Yang and Borland (1991), Borland and Yang (1992) and Shi and Yang (1995).   6
behaviour that is analysed within the model.  One possibility arises where the degree of 
substitutability between capital and labour is sufficiently high that returns to the 
accumulation of capital do not diminish to zero.
2  We can imagine that this might be the 
case in some manufacturing processes where human labour is readily replaced by robots, 
or in the delivery of some financial services such as ATM banking.  But it is not clear that 
this robotic model of growth is applicable to all sectors of the economy. 
More interesting, to my mind at least, are models of endogenous growth that build 
on the economic properties of complementarity, dynamic feedback and non-rivalry in 
investment.  These are the properties that distinguish the accumulation of ideas and skills 
from the accumulation of objects.  It is worthwhile considering each of them in turn. 
Complementarity of investment 
Complementarity arises when your investment increases the return (monetary 
and/or psychic) to my investment.  This may occur when we invest in activities that 
exhibit network externalities.   Learning to play chess, to speak Esperanto, or to read and 
write becomes much more rewarding for me if others invest in the same skills.  
Complementarity is not exclusive to investment in human capital; the benefits I get from 
investing in a telephone line and a fax machine are also enhanced when others do the 
same.  But complementarity is probably more pervasive in the accumulation of skills than 
in the accumulation of objects.  Indeed such complementarity is an essential ingredient of 
the development of ‘social capital’. 
Complementarity is a feature of the endogenous growth model of Lucas (1988) 
where the productivity of any worker is enhanced not only by their individual level of 
skill but also by the average skill level amongst their fellow workers.  This implies that 
the economic analysis of external effects is relevant to growth.  Although my productivity 
depends in part on your human capital, I cannot expect you to take that into account when 
you decide how much education and training to undertake – and vice versa.  So if we 
make individual decisions about the time and money we spend on education and training, 
we are likely to under-invest.    It follows, from Lucas’s analysis of such externalities, 
that there may be an important role for government to play.  Subsidising education will 
improve economic welfare in the sense that everyone will be better off as a result of an 
increase in human capital.
3 
Dynamic feedback 
These education externalities are not, however, sufficient in themselves to drive 
long-run growth.  In Lucas’ model, the rate of output growth is still limited by 
diminishing returns to the accumulation of both physical and human capital.  He 
endogenises growth by appealing to another feature of education: dynamic feedback.  As 
we learn more, it becomes easier to acquire further knowledge and skills.  An obvious 
                                                 
2 This possibility was canvassed by the Australian economist, John Pitchford (1960), who illustrated his 
argument using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function. 
3 This is not the only reason for subsidising education.  Given that many parents are constrained in 
financing their children’s education, there are both equity and efficiency reasons for public support.   7
example is reading.  Once we have learnt this skill, the acquisition of further information 
and skills is facilitated through book learning.     
This view of dynamic feedback can be represented by a function expressing the 
change in the level of human capital in some representative household as a function of the 
amount of adult labour time, Lh, that is devoted to education (of self or of children) and 







γ φ =  [3] 
The extent of dynamic feedback is captured by the value of the exponential 
parameter γ.   Α  value of zero implies that there is no feedback.  Aggregate output per 
person, y, now depends on both physical and human capital per person: 
  () () tt t yA k h
αβ =  [4] 
where we maintain the assumption of diminishing returns by restricting α, β  < 1.   
Endogenous growth is made feasible by the existence of positive feedback in the 
second sector of this economy, the education sector.  To demonstrate this, take logarithms 
of equation [4], differentiate with respect to time and substitute equation [3] to derive the 
growth rate of output per worker: 
  1
11 1 1 tt t t h
tt t t t
d y dk dh dk L
dt y dt k dt h dt k h
γ
φ
αβ α β − =+ = +  [5] 
Whether or not the accumulation of human capital can drive long-run growth is 
determined by the final term in this equation.  With no positive feedback, i.e. if γ=0 , this 
term diminishes to zero as the level of human capital, ht, increases over time.  (This is 
exactly what happens to the physical capital term, as a given investment rate leads to 
slower and slower proportional growth in the stock.)  But if there is sufficiently high 
feedback in human capital accumulation, i.e. if γ=1 , the final term in [5] is a positive 
constant.  That is to say, the long-run growth rate is positive.  Moreover, it is increasing 
in the amount of labour time that is devoted to education.   
Given sufficient dynamic feedback, public subsidy of education and training can 
increase long-run growth. In the presence of positive externalities, or other sources of 
market failure, such policy will also increase economic welfare. 
Embodied or disembodied human capital 
Is it reasonable, however, to suppose that the feedback effect is sufficiently strong 
to make education the engine of long-run growth?  Note that even if the feedback 
parameter is close to unity, say γ= 0.9, the long-run rate of growth in [5] will diminish to 
zero as the level of human capital increases.  Stable long-run growth requires a parameter 
value of unity.  It also requires that there be no limit to the accumulation of human 
capital.  Human capacities to think, organise and remember are, however, usually   8
presumed to be finite.  Moreover, our skills and abilities die with us and have to be 
replaced in every successive generation.
4 
In addressing the problem of limits to human capabilities, Paul Romer (1990) 
emphasises the distinction between the skills and abilities that are embodied in individual 
humans, and disembodied knowledge.  He focuses on the properties of the latter category, 
the world of ideas and research, supposing that there is sufficient dynamic feedback in the 
research sector to generate endogenous growth and that the scope for developing new 
ideas is limitless.   
In Romer’s model, it is the number of people engaged in research and 
development that drives long-run growth.  His mathematical representation of the 








φ =  [6] 
where At represents the number of productive ideas that have been realised at time t in 
history and the differential, dA/dt, is the current output of new ideas from the research 
sector.    LA represents the amount of human capital, or the number of researchers, 
devoted to innovation.   
Crucially, Romer assumes that the rate of innovation is directly proportional to the 
extant stock of knowledge.  This is the ‘standing on shoulders’ hypothesis of knowledge 
accumulation, so labelled by Charles Jones (1998), in reference to Isaac Newton’s 
disclaimer: 
“If I have seen farther than others, it is because I was 
standing on the shoulders of giants.” 
In the accumulation of disembodied ideas, rather than embodied skills, it is indeed 
plausible to suppose that the level of current output might be directly proportional to the 
size of the stock.  The more ideas and theorems that we have to draw on, the easier it is to 
generate new ones.  Moreover, ideas do not necessarily disappear when their developer 
dies – they can typically be recorded and transmitted at minimal cost. 
Implicit in Romer’s formulation of research output is the idea that there is an 
evenly distributed and infinite universe of potential ideas waiting to be discovered.  So a 
given amount of research effort will produce a predictable number of new ideas.   A more 
realistic approach, allowing the discovery rate to fluctuate, is summarised by Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) in their discussion of General Purpose Technologies stemming from 
innovations such as the steam engine, the electric dynamo and the computer. 
Non-rivalry of ideas 
As well as hypothesising dynamic feedback in the generation of new ideas, Romer 
                                                 
4 Lucas (1988) asserts that his model of endogenous growth can be sustained across generations if a child’s 
initial endowment of human capital is proportional to the level already attained by the adults – but, unless 
Lysenko was correct, the genetic transmission of acquired human capital is unlikely.   9
emphasises that ideas have another significant economic property, non-rivalry.  Objects 
are usually rival, meaning that if you are using something, I cannot use it at the same 
time.  But this is not true of ideas.  Once the binomial theorem has been published, your 
use of it does not in any way interfere with my use of it. 
Of course, people can try to stop others from making use of patented ideas.   But 
the excludability of ideas depends on the actions of people supported by institutions of 
laws and property rights, rather than non-rivalry, which is an inherent features of ideas.   
Romer makes use of this distinction by assuming that ideas are fully excludable in 
their application to the production of goods. For example, a researcher can acquire full 
patent protection for the design of a new drug; it can only be manufactured if royalties are 
paid.  On the other hand, she has no protection against other researchers who can reverse 
engineer her ideas and come up with their own different but improved drug design.  
Indeed, when the original researcher files her patent, she has to describe her idea, thereby 
providing her rivals with a free input into their subsequent research.   
Romer’s hypothesis that ideas are non-rival and non-excludable in the research 
process has important implications for public policy.  Researchers may reap the benefits 
from the direct application of their ideas, but they do not receive monetary reward from 
others who ‘stand on their shoulders’.  Left to the market, there will be an under-supply 
of research effort.  Public intervention is required to subsidise research, hence stimulate 
growth, up to the socially optimum level. 
Other aspects of knowledge accumulation are analysed by Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) who emphasise the Schumpeterian notion of 
‘creative destruction’.  Patent rights may bestow monopoly power on the producer of a 
particular generation of an innovative good; but they cannot prevent the development by 
a rival of the next generation of goods which are superior in quality and/or price.  The 
creation of the improved version destroys the flow of profits to the previous monopolist.  
Unbridled competition in such a market can lead to too much research being carried out, 
where the research is concerned with marginal quality improvements rather than new 
products and processes.  Nevertheless, such research is still capable of driving long-run 
economic growth. 
 
2.  The Cambridge Counter-Revolution 
The intellectual euphoria of endogenous growth theory was challenged by a group 
of economists, mostly connected with or based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who chose 
to stand behind (or on the shoulders of) Nobel laureate Robert Solow of MIT.   
Solow (1994) himself is critical of the knife-edge assumption required to generate 
stable long-run growth in the models of Romer and Lucas.  His point is that these models 
require the dynamic feedback parameter in the education / research sector to be exactly 
equal to unity.  If we look back to Lucas’ model, where the growth rate of the economy is 
determined by equation [5], we can see that a value of 0.9 for the parameter, γ,   will, 
eventually, reduce growth to zero:  the final term of that equation has ht
1-γ  in the 
denominator, which drives the term to zero as human capital, ht, rises if γ  is less than one.    10
Stable long-run growth requires that the parameter be exactly one. 
Romer (1994) has argued that this knife-edge property can be overcome in a more 
complex model.  More damaging to the endogenous growth cause, however, has been the 
empirical work of another Cambridge (Harvard)-based economist, Greg Mankiw.  In a 
much-cited paper - Mankiw et al. (1992) - he and his co-authors do not tackle the 
endogenous growth modelers head-on.  Rather, they steal the ball of human capital from 
the endogenous growth scrum and use it to reconstruct the 1956 Solow model.   
Their “augmented Solow model” includes human capital as a third factor in the 
aggregate production function, alongside capital and unskilled labour.  They investigate 
the relationship between steady-state levels of output and the three inputs, using 
secondary school enrolment rates as a proxy for the rate of investment in human capital.  
They conclude that the factors are of approximately equal importance – i.e. that the 
elasticity of output with respect to each factor is approximately one third – and that 
together they account for eighty percent of the observed variation in 1985 income levels 
across some 98 nations.    
This was a neat sidestep, rather than a direct hit on endogenous growth theory.  
There was no attempt to directly confront the two models with a discriminating statistical 
test, but the 1956 model was effectively rehabilitated – even though the econometric 
evidence is likely to be flawed due to the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  
Moreover, this was only half time in the comeback match.  In an equally influential 
second-half, the Mankiw et al. (1992) paper provided a clever re-interpretation of an 
empirical regularity.  Studies of post-war economic growth had typically reported a 
conditional convergence effect.  These studies ran regression models of the form: 
  () 0 ln ln ln iT io io i yy y α β ε −= + ++ Xi g  [7] 
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of y, output per capita (or per worker), 
over a period of T years.  Xi represents a vector of additional explanatory variables.  
‘Conditional convergence’ is said to exist if the regression parameter, β , is negative –a 
lower starting value for y is associated with a higher subsequent rate of growth, 
conditional on the X variables that explain differences in rates of growth.   
Previous authors
5 had interpreted conditional convergence as evidence that 
technological spillovers from the most advanced economies enabled less advanced 
economies to imitate and thus enjoy relatively fast productivity growth.  The Mankiw-
Romer-Weil re-interpretation of such evidence, echoed by their Harvard colleagues 
Robert Barro and Jeffrey Sachs,
6 involves treating the X variables as determinants of the 
neo-classical steady state, rather than the long-run growth rate.  They then interpret the 
initial income variable (lny0) as a measure of distance from steady state and the β -
coefficient as a measure of the speed of convergence to steady state. 
This re-interpretation of the evidence in favour of the neo-classical model has 
                                                 
5 For example, Abramovitz (1986) and Dowrick and Nguyen (1989). 
6 See Barro and Lee (1994) and Sachs and Warner (1997).   11
been complemented by the more direct approach of MIT graduate, Charles Jones.
7  He 
highlights the fact that endogenous growth models based on the accumulation of 
knowledge, such as Romer’s model, typically suggest that the rate of growth should be an 
increasing function of the resources devoted to R&D.
8  He cites evidence from the US 
that contradicts this prediction:  
“Since 1950, the fraction of the labour force engaged in formal R&D has increased 
by almost a factor of three.  Despite these changes, average growth rates … are no 
higher today than they were from 1870 to 1929..”             
       Jones  (1998) 
Jones also criticises some of the key assumptions underpinning the knowledge-
based models of endogenous growth.  In particular, he suggests that knowledge creation 
may become more difficult over time as the easy ideas are discovered first, leaving 
subsequent researchers with a pool that has been ‘fished out’.  He also suggests that 
researchers may often duplicate each other’s efforts: ‘stepping on toes’ rather than 
‘standing on shoulders’.  
These critiques of endogenous growth theory seem to imply that policies aimed at 
increasing investment in education and/or research will not be successful in raising the 
rate of economic growth for a sustained length of time.  I will argue in the next section of 
the paper that this is not necessarily the case. 
 
3.  Reconciling conflicting theories of growth 
A crucial difference between the neo-classical and new growth theories concerns 
the question of whether the long-run rate of growth of the economy is some exogenous 
constant or whether it can be influenced by public policy.  Put another way, the question 
is whether policies and institutions that influence the rate of accumulation of physical 
and/or human capital have long-run effects on the level of economic activity or on its rate 
of growth.  For purposes of practical policy-making, however, this distinction may be 
relatively unimportant - if the ‘long-run’ never arrives.  Looking back to Figure 1, if 
economies are subject to shocks of sufficient magnitude and frequency, it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the long-run growth path really looks like path 
B or path C.  In the ‘short-run’ – between time T0 when the first major shock occurs and 
some time T1 when another such event occurs – the paths may be virtually 
indistinguishable. 
The evidence of the neo-classical revivalists can be interpreted to support this 
view.  Mankiw et al. (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sachs and Warner 
(1997) all report growth regression evidence suggesting that the rate of convergence 
towards steady state is of the order of two percentage points per year, implying that it will 
                                                 
7 See Jones (1995a) and Jones (1995b). 
8 Although Aghion and Howitt (1998) show that their Schumpeterian model of endogenous innovation can 
be adapted to eliminate the scale effect   12
take more than thirty years for a country to halve the gap between its current income and 
the steady state level.
9  Within a half-life of several decades, we must surely expect that 
there will be changes in investment rates and changes in the rate of technological 
progress such that the neo-classical economy is rarely able to get close to steady state.    
A useful way to think of this problem is to consider the specification of the Error 
Correction Model.  The ECM is commonly used to decompose macroeconomic time-
series into cyclical and long-run components and to test for long-run cointegrating 
relationships.  A typical regression is of the form: 
  () { } [ ] 11 1 1 ln ln ln tt t t t t t yy y αλ β ε −− − − −= − + −+ XX Z  [8] 
where y represents real output and the dependent variable is the growth rate of output.  
The explanatory variables are segregated.  The X variables, which influence short-run 
movements, are entered in first differences.  The Z factors are entered as lagged 
variables, along with the lagged value of output, yt-1.  For analysis of the long-run path, 
the first differences are set to zero, yielding the long run path for output as a function of 
the Z variables:    
  ** ln TT y = Z β  [9] 
This very general empirical specification is consistent with both exogenous 
growth and endogenous growth models.  If the Z vector contains a time trend, T, the 
regression coefficient on T is an estimate of the exogenous rate of technological progress 
– as in the neo-classical model.  However, the Z vector may equally well contain the time 
trend interacted with another variable, such as the level of human capital.  If so, the 
coefficient on this term captures the impact of human capital on the long-run growth rate 
of the economy – as predicted by some endogenous growth models. 
In the ECM framework, the sign of the regression coefficient λ  indicates whether 
output converges to the long-run path.  The square brackets in [8] capture last period’s 
deviation from the long-run path.  The negative value of λ  indicates the proportion of last 
period’s ‘error’ that is ‘corrected’ in the current period.   
A typical time-series study that is trying to identify breaks in trend growth, using 
thirty to forty annual observations, might find a half-life for the business cycle of two to 
three years.
10  In this context, the ‘trend’ growth is approximated by the average growth 
rate over one or two decades, averaging out fluctuations over three or four business 
cycles.  But if convergence to the neo-classical steady state growth path has a half-life of 
                                                 
9 Subsequent studies on panel data have estimated higher speeds of convergence: in particular, Islam 
(1995) and Lee et al. (1997) estimate annual convergence rates up to nine percent and thirty percent 
respectively.  But Dowrick and Rogers (2002) show that these studies confound the effects of neo-classical 
convergence – due to diminishing returns to investment – with the effects of international technology 
diffusion.  Separating out these effects, they find that the half-life of neo-classical convergence is more than 
fifteen years. 
10 A pooled time-series cross-section study by Lee et al. (1997), allowing for heterogeneity in country-
specific time trends, has estimated convergence in the Solow-Swan model to have a half-life of 2.5 years.  I 
interpret this as a failure to distinguish the speed of transition to steady state from the fluctuations of the 
business cycle.   13
thirty years, this time-scale is clearly insufficient to capture the underlying long-run rate 
of growth.  Rather, we are identifying changes in the slope of the transitional growth 
path.  
This supposition is confirmed by the recent study of Jones (2001).  He adopts a 
modified growth accounting approach to analyse the last fifty years of US growth.  He 
finds that only one fifth of the actual growth rate of labour productivity (averaging 2.0 
percent per year) has been attributable to exogenous technical change.  The remaining 
four-fifths of growth (1.6 percent per year) is attributable to continued growth in 
education and research intensity.  In his terms, (p. 23): “Transition dynamics associated 
with educational attainment and the growth in research intensity account for 80 percent of 
growth”.   
Jones’ conclusion is couched in the language of the neo-classical approach.  
Sustained growth above steady state levels can only be transitional and is driven by 
sustained (but ultimately bounded) growth in the share of GDP going to investment in 
human capital.  An alternative interpretation of the same evidence might claim that 
increased investment in human capital has raised the long-run endogenous rate of growth.    
Evidence that reconciles the two approaches to understanding growth comes from 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) who carry out econometric estimation on various models to 
explain variation in 20-year growth rates (1965-85) on a cross-section of 78 countries.  In 
their preferred model, technological progress is the sum of two components: an 
exogenous component, as in the neo-classical model; and a semi-endogenous component, 
related to the rate of absorption of technology from the technological leading country, 
captured by an interactive term between the productivity gap and the level of human 
capital.  Their preferred model draws on the analysis of Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
They report that the interactive term is statistically significant, supporting the idea 
that there is an endogenous component to technological progress.  At the same time, they 
estimate an output elasticity close to 0.5 for physical capital, suggesting diminishing 
returns to investment and a slow rate of convergence towards the steady state capital 
stock.   
Broadly similar results are reported by Dowrick and Rogers (2002).  Our study 
differs from that of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) in that we carry out the analysis on a 
panel of growth data.  This enables us to test for country-specific effects.  We also use an 
instrumental variable estimator to control for reverse causation between growth and the 
explanatory variables.  Country-specific effects, which we interpret as endogenous 
components of technical progress, are found to be important.  We confirm the finding that 
the level of human capital facilitates technological catch-up, especially amongst the 
middle-income and richer countries. 
These models combine features of the neo-classical theory with the new growth 
theory.  Changes in the rate of physical investment have, ultimately, only level effects; 
but within a time frame of one or two decades this is indistinguishable from a growth 
effect. At the same time, countries have different rates of technological progress with an 
endogenous component, dependent on the stock of human capital and the allocation of 
resources to research, and a semi-endogenous component, dependent on the rate of 
technological change at the frontier and on the country’s ability to absorb ideas from   14
abroad.      
 
4.  Evidence on Education and Growth 
Some of the earliest studies that investigated the link between education and 
economic growth were conducted by Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (1991).  They 
examined variations in school enrolment rates, using a single cross-section of both the 
industrialised and the less-developed countries.  Both studies concluded that schooling 
has a significantly positive impact on the rate of growth of real GDP.  They interpreted 
this as evidence of changes to (short-run) transitional growth paths.   Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) also investigated the impact of educational expenditures by governments, 
finding that they have a strong positive impact.  Using instrumental variable techniques to 
control for simultaneous causation, their regressions suggest that the annual rate of return 
on public education is of the order of twenty percent.
11 
A series of subsequent studies made use of panel data, examining changes over 
time in both education and growth.   Several of these panel studies - including Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994), Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) - failed to detect any 
significant relationship between the rate of increase of educational capital and the rate of 
economic growth.  They suggested that the positive findings of the earlier cross-section 
studies were due to omitted variable bias, failing to control for country-specific effects.   
More recently, a third generation of studies has suggested a number of reasons 
why the negative findings of previous panel studies might have been biased.  Pritchett 
(2001) has argued that poor policies and institutions have hampered growth in many of 
the least developed economies, directing skilled labour into relatively unproductive 
activities, hence disrupting the statistical relationship between education and growth in 
samples that include less-developed economies.  Krueger and Lindahl (2001) suggest that 
the problem of unobserved variation in educational quality is exacerbated in panel data.   
Taking data quality into account, they show that increases in the stock of schooling do 
improve short-run economic growth.  Hanushek and Kimko (2000) confirm that direct 
measures of labour-force quality, from international mathematics and science test scores, 
are strongly related to growth.  Temple (2001) finds that growth effects are positive, but 
non-linear.  These non-linear effects may be missed by studies that impose linearity.  
Overall, it seems that studies that pool the least and the most developed 
economies do not find consistent and robust relationships between education and growth.  
                                                 
11 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) report an increasing marginal effect on growth of years of schooling – but 
this may be due to a lack of variation in the data on primary enrolments.   More surprising is their finding 
that positive growth effects are confined to male education.  On the other hand, a study by Caselli et al. 
(1996) uses a more sophisticated panel estimation technique (General Method of Moments) and reverses 
the result – it is female secondary education rather than male education that promotes growth.  This finding 
is confirmed by Knowles et al. (2002).  These contradictory results probably reflect strong colinearity 
between female education, male education and other measures of development, such as life expectancy and 
fertility, which are included in the regressions.  Moreover, where many women are involved in domestic 
rather than market economic activity, the educational enhancement of their contribution to economic 
welfare may not be picked up directly by standard measures of GDP.     15
For evaluation of Australian policy, it is probably more useful to examine studies that are 
restricted to OECD economies.   
Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate the determinants of countries’ steady-state income 
levels as a function of investment in both physical and human capital.  For their cross-
section of OECD countries, they estimate an elasticity of 0.76 between steady-state 
output and the proportion of the workforce enrolled in secondary school.  Translating the 
elasticity into the marginal impact of an additional year of schooling in OECD countries 
(where average schooling varies between five and twelve years), this implies that steady-
state real GDP increases in a range of six to fifteen percent, with an estimated eight 
percent increase for a country like Australia with average schooling of ten years. 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) analyse panel data, using annual data for 21 
OECD countries from 1971 to 1998.  They use a Pooled Mean Group estimator, which 
allows for cross-country variations in short-run coefficients, but they test for and impose 
homogeneity on long-run coefficients.  Their most reliable estimates suggest that the 
return to an additional year of schooling is a six percent increase in steady-state output.   
 
Table 1 
Predicted increase in the level of output for an additional year 




Scarpetta (2002)  6 % 
Mankiw et al. (1992)  6% - 15% 
 
These macroeconomic estimates refer to that part of the social returns to 
schooling that is captured in GDP.  It appears that these estimates are close in magnitude 
to microeconomic estimates of private returns to the education of individuals.  This 
implies that the external effects of education are relatively small, at least in the context of 
the level effects of education. 
These conclusions must be modified, however, in the light of a series of empirical 
studies that have been inspired by the hypothesis of Nelson and Phelps (1966) that human 
capital may influence the rate of introduction of new technologies.  Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994), for example, compare models that treat human capital as a direct input into 
production with models treating human capital as an intermediate input into the 
acquisition of skills and/or knowledge.  The former implies a relationship between output 
growth and educational growth, whereas the latter implies a relationship between output 
growth and the average stock of human capital per worker.  Their econometric evidence 
favours the latter model.  A more educated work-force can more readily identify, adapt 
and implement new ideas – whether the ideas are generated domestically or overseas.     16
This finding, that education levels affect long-run technological progress, is 
confirmed by Frantzen (2000) who analyses the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) 
between 1961 and 1991 in the business sectors of 21 OECD countries.  It is also 
confirmed by Dowrick and Rogers (2002) who investigate the rate of technological 
convergence between 1970 and 1990 for a wide sample of 51 countries and for a sample 
of 35 relatively rich countries.   
These studies share a common regression specification of the general form: 
  ( ) ... ii i TFP growth in country i S S f pr α β =+ +  (10) 
where Si is the average years of schooling in the adult population, and pri is the ratio of 
productivity in the technologically leading country relative to country i.    
The first regression coefficient, α , captures the impact of schooling on domestic 
innovation.  The second regression coefficient, β , captures the impact of schooling on the 
absorption of technological spillovers from the technologically leading country. 
All three studies find that the level of schooling is a statistically significant 
determinant of growth.  The predicted effect of an additional year of schooling in the 
adult population on the annual rate of growth of total factor productivity is  ( ) i f pr α β +.  
Considering the case of Australia, where the US productivity ratio is approximately 1.5, 
we compare the predicted growth effects of schooling in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Predicted increase in long-run economic growth in Australia 
due to an additional year of schooling in the adult population 
STUDY GROWTH  EFFECT 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)  0.3 percentage points 
Frantzen (2000)  0.8 percentage points 
Dowrick & Rogers (2002)    0.2 – 0.5  
percentage points
* 
* The lower of these estimates is derived using the coefficient reported in Table 2, using the full sample of 
countries.  The higher estimate is from the coefficients in Table 3, using the 35 country sample of relatively 
rich economies with better data quality. 
 
Even the lowest of these estimates predicts a highly significant boost to annual 
economic growth, one fifth of a percentage point, for every additional year of schooling.   
 
Australia’s educational attainment report 
In the light of these estimates, it is of interest to draw up a report card on   17
Australia’s record of educational attainment.  The data we use are taken from Barro and 
Lee (2001) who have revised and updated their previous estimates of the average years of 
schooling in the population aged 25 and over.  Figure 2 shows the time path of this 
measure for Australia and selected OECD countries.   
Forty years ago, Australian adults averaged 9.4 years of schooling, a level of 
attainment that was not only significantly above that of the other countries illustrated, but 
was surpassed only by New Zealand out of the one hundred countries covered by Barro 
and Lee.  By the year 2000, Australia’s average schooling level had climbed to 10.6 
years.  Attainment rose faster, however, in all of our comparator countries, with the result 
that Australia has slipped below the USA, Norway, Sweden and Canada and is only 
fractionally higher than Korea and slightly higher than Japan. 
Of course, the average of years of schooling is an imperfect measure of skills and 
abilities, since educational quality varies across countries and over time, and because it 
ignores the abilities acquired through experience and workplace training.  In the mid-
1990s twenty countries participated in the OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey.  
This survey provides a direct comparison of work-related skills, including measures of 
literacy and numeracy.  Figure 3 presents a scatter plot which demonstrates that, on either 
measure, Australian adults rate close to the OECD average. 
The Third International Maths and Science Study, conducted in 1994 and 1995, 
confirms Australia’s average performance.  On measures of 7
th grade proficiency in 
Maths and Science, Australian school students ranked fifteenth and twelfth respectively, 
out of the 37 country scores reported by Barro and Lee (2001).   
These international comparisons suggest that Australia’s educational report card 
should be marked: ‘Started well, but slackened off.  Substantial room for improvement.’ 
 
   FIGURE 2 


















Source:  Barro & Lee (2001)  18




5.  The contribution of R&D to Economic Growth 
I have already discussed the attributes of knowledge that make it significantly 
different from the accumulation of items of physical capital.  These special attributes are 
non-rivalry and dynamic feedback.  Once a new idea has been generated, it can be used 
simultaneously and costlessly in many different processes.  Furthermore, the idea can 
serve as an example and inspiration for further research. 
These are the attributes of knowledge that give it the potential to drive long-run 
growth.  But the properties of non-rivalry and feedback also suggest that the market may 
fail to allocate sufficient resources to knowledge generation because individuals have 
difficulty in establishing and enforcing property rights over their new ideas – some of the 
benefits of an innovation are likely to accrue to others.  When the private return to 
innovation is less than the social return, governments need to subsidise R&D.   
Paul Romer (1993) has argued that whilst governments should fund fundamental 
research, it may well be appropriate for self-funding industry associations to fund 
development and applied research - using government only to enforce the collection of 
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agreed contributions.
12  Weder and Grubel (1993) expand this point in their discussion of 
the 'Coasean' institutions which operate in various countries to internalise knowledge 
spillovers and promote technical progress.  In particular, they cite the occurrence of three 
types: (i) industry associations such as the Japanese Keiretsu or Swiss Verbande; (ii) 
conglomerate corporations, including multi-national enterprises; and (iii) geographic 
clustering of industries, such as Silicon Valley or the Northern Italian networks.  They 
point particularly to the Swiss and Japanese examples, where voluntary associations, 
supported by public policy, encourage long-run relationships between vertically related 
firms and encourage joint ventures and cooperation including joint research and training 
schemes. 
R&D expenditures typically constitute, for advanced economies, only a few 
percent of GDP  - perhaps one tenth of the expenditure devoted to investment in physical 
equipment and structures.  In a standard growth accounting framework, variations in 
research effort will, therefore, explain very little of the differences in growth rates 
between countries.  But the point of much of the new growth theory is precisely that if 
knowledge spillovers are substantial, and if knowledge exhibits dynamic feedback 
effects, then even small changes in the resources devoted to the production of knowledge 
may result in substantial changes in economic growth.  This point is made by Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) who calibrate their model to match the US growth experience.  They 
predict that, whilst business investment constitutes around ten percent of GDP, 
investment in R&D - the engine of growth - need comprise as little as 1.6 percent to 
generate economic growth of 2.5 percent per year.   
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) surveyed some fifteen previous studies into R&D 
investment by US firms and industries, reporting real private rates of return averaging 
25%.  Their own econometric study of two thousand US firms revealed a 30% rate of 
return on company funded R&D, a ‘productivity premium’ on basic research, and a 7% 
return on federally funded company research.  These estimates of private rates of return 
on company-funded R&D are very high, given that investment in physical capital might 
be expected to earn a return closer to ten percent.  The higher rate of return on research 
reflects, presumably, a large premium for risk and problems in diversifying or pooling 
such risk.   
Nadiri (1993) confirms that private returns to R&D are particularly high in his 
review of the literature: “ .. net rates of return on own R&D of 20% to 30% at the firm 
level and 10% to 30% at the industry level are reasonable sets of estimates.”  He goes on 
to examine spillovers to other industries and concludes:  
“The spillover effects of R&D are often much larger than the effect of own R&D at 
the industry level … social rates of return often vary from 20% to over 100% with an 
average somewhere close to 50%.” (Nadiri, pp 34-35) 
A subsequent paper by Lichtenberg (1992) is one of the first attempts at studying 
the cross-country evidence on the impact of R&D expenditures on both the level and the 
rate of growth of real GDP.  Using a sample of 74 countries, his growth regressions, 
using the neo-classical framework, reveal that returns to R&D are approximately double 
                                                 
12 Australian agricultural research has long been funded on this basis.   20
the returns to physical investment – a result that is broadly consistent with estimates from 
the microeconomic studies of firms and industries. 
Coe and Helpman (1995) try to quantify the magnitude of international R&D 
spillovers.  They seek to explain variations in the annual growth of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for 21 OECD countries, plus Israel, over the period 1970-90.  Their 
econometric analysis finds that the stock of knowledge in one country, measured by 
cumulated historical R&D expenditures, raises productivity in foreign countries with 
which they trade.  It is not clear exactly why the extent of technology transfer should 
depend on the magnitude of trade with a technologically advanced economy, though their 
empirical findings appear to be quite robust and have been confirmed by subsequent 
studies.  One plausible explanation stems from the observation by Eaton and Kortum 
(2001) that the high R&D economies are also the major world exporters of capital goods.  
The general trade variable used by Coe & Helpman may be acting as a proxy for the 
import of high tech capital goods for which the producers are unable to expropriate all of 
the rents. 
Frantzen (2000) has extended the Coe and Helpman approach and provides us 
with estimates of rates of return on domestic R&D as well as estimating the strength of 
international technological spillovers. He finds that the following regression has strong 
statistical significance on a sample of 21 OECD countries: 
 
The annual growth rate of TFP in the business sector, 1961-91   
=    0.59  x  (gross expenditure on own R&D) / (business sector GDP)      
+    1.52  x  SUM { (research intensity in country i) * (import share from country i) } 
 
The first regression coefficient is an estimate of the national (social) rate of return 
to R&D – capturing not only the productivity benefits that accrue to the firms which 
make the investments but also the spillover benefits that accrue to firms in the same or 
related industries.  The second regression coefficient captures the spillover benefit that a 
country can gain from research carried out by a trading partner.  This benefit is 
proportional to the share of imports from that country in GDP – perhaps reflecting the 
embodied technological improvements in imported capital equipment. 
It is instructive to compare Frantzen’s estimates with other estimates of returns to 
R&D expenditures.  A summary is provided in Table 3.  Interestingly, he estimates a 59% 
social rate of return on national R&D expenditures, which is close to the average figure 
suggested by Nadiri’s review of firm and industry-level studies.   It is also close to the 
results of Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996) who estimate that the 
social rate of return on domestic R&D is 51% in the large G7 economies but 63% in six 
smaller European countries. 
All of these estimates lie substantially above the various estimates of private rates 
of return, implying that there are very significant spillover effects between the firms and 
industries within a national economy. 
The implication for Australia of the benchmark Frantzen estimate can be   21
calculated as follows.  Our gross annual R&D expenditure (public and private combined) 
of around ten billion dollars amounts to one and a half percent of total GDP, or 
approximately two percent of business sector value added.  An additional billion dollars 
annual expenditure on R&D, representing one fifth of one percent value added, is 
predicted to increase the annual growth rate by just over one tenth of a percentage point. 
 
Table 3 
Estimated Rates of Return on R&D Expenditures 
 
Study  Sample  Rates of Return 









i)  survey of fifteen previous 
studies of US firms and 
industries 
25%    
  ii) 2000 US firms  30%     
Nadiri (1993)  survey of fifty US and other 





Lichtenberg and van 
Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (1996) 
GDP growth across OECD 
countries 
 51-63%  
Frantzen (2000)  Business sector TFP growth 
across OECD countries 
 59%  45%* 
       
* if the imports/GDP ratio equals  0.3. 
 
What would happen if the countries from which Australia imports capital goods 
were each to increase their research intensity by 0.2 percentage points (the same rise as in 
the example above for Australia)?  If we multiply the regression coefficient on foreign 
R&D by Australia’s total share of imports in GDP, which is thirty percent, we find that 
technology spillovers are predicted to increase Australian growth by just over one tenth 
of a percentage point.  In other words, domestic R&D and spillovers from foreign R&D 
are of roughly equal importance for productivity growth. 
If these estimates of national rates of return are approximately right, Australia and 
other OECD countries appear to be suffering from gross under-investment in R&D.  
Public and private funds that are currently being devoted to investments with much lower 
rates of return would be profitably diverted into R&D.  Jones and Williams (2000) reach   22
a similar conclusion in their analysis of returns to investment in R&D in the USA. 
 
Australia’s investment in R&D  
Compared with the leading industrial economies of the OECD, Australia invests 
less of its resources into R&D – and a lesser proportion of that investment is carried out 
within the business sector.  In Figure 4 we see that the share of GDP devoted to R&D in 
Australia has been growing over the past few decades, from under one percent to around 
one and a half percent.  Our research intensity is, however, still well below that achieved 
by other major industrial economies such as Japan, the USA and Germany where the 
R&D ratio has averaged two and a half percent over the past twenty years.   On the other 
hand, Australian R&D intensity is close to or above that of Canada and New Zealand, 
countries with comparably large rural sectors.  R&D intensity dipped after peaking at 
1.7% in 1996.  This is attributable in the first instance to a fall in R&D within the 
business sector of the Australian economy, which was driven in part by the reduction in 
the tax concession for R&D. 
Even at its peak, the Australian business sector’s contribution to R&D has been 
comparatively low.  In Figure 5 we see that the proportion of total R&D that is carried 
out in the business sector had been rising from 1981 up to 1995, from 25% to 51%, but 
then fell to 45% by 1998.  In the economies that are illustrated in Figure 6, with the 
exception of Australia and New Zealand, well over half of national R&D was carried out 
by the business sector.   
An interesting perspective on Australian performance on a broader measure of 
‘Investment in Knowledge’ comes from OECD (2001) which aggregates expenditures on 
R&D, higher education and computer software.  On this measure, Australia ranks 
fourteenth out of the 24 countries surveyed.  In terms of the rate of growth of knowledge 
investment over the 1990s, Australia ranks tenth.    
   23
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6. Conclusions 
The neo-classical revival in growth theory has had the paradoxical effect of 
reinforcing one of the major points of the endogenous growth revolution.  The driving 
force of economic growth is investment in human capital – skills and ideas – rather than 
investment in machines and buildings.  The academic debate will no doubt continue over 
whether government policies that affect the rate of investment have any influence on the 
long-run, as well as the short-run, rate of growth of the economy.  For practical purposes, 
however, if the ‘short-run’ involves a transition period of several decades, this debate 
may be strictly academic - in the pejorative sense of the word.  Policies that affect 
investment, particularly in embodied or disembodied human capital, can have a sustained 
impact on economic growth.  
A review of empirical studies on sources of economic growth confirms these 
claims: both education and R&D are important sources of growth.  In the mid 1990s, a 
number of studies were published claiming that there was no systematic relationship 
between changes in national educational attainment and changes in economic growth.  
Subsequent studies have, however, established that this lack of correlation was due to a 
mix of factors:  poor institutional performance in some less developed economies, and a 
failure to account for international variation in educational quality.  Once we account for 
these factors, the evidence suggests returns to education that are consistent with micro-
economic evidence on individual earnings.  An increase of one year of schooling in the 
average educational attainment in the workforce, for example, can be expected to 
increase the long-run level of output by around eight percent in a typical OECD country.   
These are estimates of the level effects of education.  A one-off increase in 
attainment will produce a one-off rise (albeit spread over time) in the level of GDP per 
capita.  There is mounting evidence, however, that there are also substantial dynamic or 
growth effects, which are linked to a country’s ability to implement new technologies.  
This evidence suggests that Australia would do well to increase its educational levels to 
match the OECD leaders – the USA and Scandinavia. 
One of the concerns of current public debate is that the ageing of the Australian 
population over the next fifty years will over-tax (literally and metaphorically) the 
working-age population.  From the perspective of growth theory, however, there may not 
be so much to fear.  The ageing of the demographic structure is being driven by the 
revolution in female education and workforce opportunities.  For the generation born in 
the 1930s, only one third of girls and one half of boys completed high school.  For the 
current generation, over seventy percent of boys and close to eighty percent of girls are 
completing Year 12.  The past fifty years have also witnessed the end of legally enforced 
discrimination against women in the workforce – in the form of the marriage bar and 
legalised wage discrimination.   These huge improvements in female education and 
workforce opportunities have been major factors in the fall in fertility, which is the 
driving force behind the changing age structure of the population.   
The very factor that is causing the ageing of the population, the revolution in 
women’s education, gives us reason to expect continued strong growth of the Australian 
economy.   The average educational attainment of the workforce will continue to rise for 
the next three decades as historical increases in school enrolments work their way   26
through the adult population.    These effects will be enhanced should educational 
enrolment continue to rise – particularly if the educational participation and achievement 
of Australia’s young men rises to meet the levels of young women. 
The evidence on the benefits of innovation is clear.  A wide range of studies finds 
that private rates of return on R&D expenditures are very high, and that social rates of 
return – taking account of intra-national spillovers of knowledge – are even higher.   
We can summarise the potential productivity benefits for Australia of increased 
investment in education and research by using relatively conservative benchmark 
estimates, based on the large number of studies that have been summarised in this paper.  
Taking education first, an increase of 0.8 in the average years of schooling of the labour 
force would take us to 11.4 years, the average of the levels of attainment in North 
America and Scandinavia.  The effect on the Australian economy would be an increase of 
one third of a percentage point in the annual growth rate – coming both through human 
capital deepening and more rapid adoption of new technologies.
13  
Turning to investment in R&D, it is probably unrealistic to suppose that Australia 
will match the research intensity of the world leaders such as the USA or Germany.  
Adopting a more realistic role model, France, would require that an extra 0.6 percent of 
GDP be devoted to R&D – taking research intensity from 1.6 percent to 2.2 percent.  
Using a conservative estimate of the social rate of return,
14 the impact on the Australian 
economy would be an increase of one quarter of a percentage point in the annual rate of 
productivity growth. 
To sum up, positive prospects for continuing strong productivity growth will be 
enhanced if Australia emulates the higher rates of investment in knowledge – both in 
education and in research and development – that we observe in the leading OECD 
economies.  An increasingly well-educated (albeit shrinking) workforce, operating in an 
economy that continues to be open to trade in goods and ideas, will be well placed to 




                                                 
13 From Table 1, the conservative estimate of the level effect is 0.8 x 6% =0.048, which is equivalent to 
0.0012 per year over forty years.  From Table 2, a conservative estimate of dynamic effect is 0.8x0.003= 
0.0024 per year.  The two effects sum to 0.0036, or 0.36 percentage points per year. 
14 Assuming the social rate of return is 0.4, which is substantially below the estimates summarised in Table 
3.   27
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